About ozhassan

Oz Hassan is an Assistant Professor at the University of Warwick, UK. He has published his work in multiple books, journals and newspapers. He is also an ESRC Future Research Leader Award Holder, and holds multiple other grants with the MOD and international consortiums. For more information go to: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/hassan/

The Geneva II process is the best hope to a conflict without any good solutions.

There are no good solutions to the conflict in Syria.  We have already seen the Syrian government accept the UN Security Council backed UN-Arab League envoy, for it to fail and chemical weapons used subsequently. Moreover, we have seen how even when the Geneva communique was issued on 30 June 2012, it has been very difficult to get all sides with interest in the conflict around the table.  The sticking points are simple, the Assad Regime believes it has a sovereign right to deal with this civil war, where as the Geneva process requires:
  1. The establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers – which includes members of the government and opposition.
  2. The establishment of a meaningful national dialogue process.
  3. Review of the constitutional order and legal system.
  4. Free and fair multiparty elections.
  5. Full representation of women in all aspects of the transition.
For the Assad Regime these premises are unacceptable, and the notion of a transitional government is also unacceptable to the Russian’s and Iranian’s.  However, because of other international events the Geneva II process is all that is on the table.
Part of the problem is that the conflict in Libya was supposed to be about preventing a genocide, which is why it managed to get UN backing, but this turned into a de facto regime change mission by the French, British and Americans.  As such, the Russians and Chinese governments have blocked a UN Security Council route to solving the Syria conflict.  Without any political will for military intervention, and the UN system blocked, all that is left are diplomatic solutions between international, regional and local actors.  Geneva II is the only show in town.
So what are the sticking points of Geneva II?
In addition to the Assad regime not wanting to give up power, it is clear that the Syrian opposition is very divided in terms of what they want, but also their desires to compromise and ability to communicate their demands.  Yet, making this more complicated it is clear that whilst the Geneva communique was being drawn up, there was less attention to how terrorists organisations were taking advantage of the conflict.  Now this is a multiplayer conflict between the Assad regime, the Syrian opposition, and terrorist organisations seeking to utilise the conflict for both political and training purposes.  This has changed the strategic calculations being made in Washington and European capitals.  The level of corridor diplomacy at Geneva II reflects this, but so does the increasing divide between the US Department of State, where John Kerry is reported to accept that Geneva II has failed, and the White house that wants to hold course on its current Syria strategy.  So it is not simply a case that the talks are destined to failure because of divides between those around the table, but also because since the Geneva process was envisaged facts on the ground have changed and helped shift strategic interests over what the solution should look like.
What does this all mean for the second round of talks?
The Geneva process is not over, and is not destined for failure entirely.   Being led by Lakhdar Brahimi, there isn’t a more experienced or appropriate peace-maker in the world, and this should provide hope.  However, it is clear that the vision set out in the Geneva communique is very unlikely to emerge. High level members of the Assad regime will not step down, because this will leave them open to the international criminal system for crimes against humanity – which are not just linked to the chemical weapons attacks but new evidence of collective punishment.  The best case scenario is that a ceasefire is agreed and holds, so that humanitarian aid can get through.  Whilst this will not be a success overall for the diplomatic process, it may well be for the 9.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (6.5 million are internally displaced; 2.4 million are refugees in neighbouring countries) and in particular the 2.5 million people that cannot currently be reached.  The Geneva II process is their best hope to a conflict without any good solutions.

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Iranian inconsistency in Geneva? No, just a recalculation.

Todays media question:

Q :How do you view the incosisitant attaitude of Rouhani? Does it mean that Rouhani is actually nothing different with Ahmadinejad?

Rouhani’s “inconsistent attitude” isn’t at all inconsistent, but rather a factor of domestic negotiation in Iran, regional relations and a product of diplomacy at Geneva.  To put it into context, internally Rouhani needs to have the backing of Ayatollah Ali Khameni and it is clear that he is undecided because he wants to make sure Iran keeps control of its nuclear cycle.  Iran does now seem willing to get around the table at Geneva, however, because international sanctions are biting hard domestically.  Under Rouhani, we have a situation where a new leadership is willing to talk and they are trying to solve their sanctions problem.  In that sense, Rouhani is different to Ahmadinejad; he is weighing up the problem differently and understanding the context Iran is operating differently.  This is very important, and why we have  a moderate success in Geneva – the US and Iran are now talking, which is fundamental to solving this problem.  This hasn’t happened in over 30 years. So fundamentally, Rouhani isn’t any less realpolitik than Ahmadinejad, but he is seeing the problem differently and acting to try and solve it in accordance with how he is viewing the situation.  
 
This is why we see Iran’s redlines, which are seeking to maintain a nuclear threshold.  Iran is not willing to abandon its nuclear programme entirely, but rather lower enrichment levels from 20% to around 4%.  This is not a complete abandonment, but rather an adjustment of speed and scope that keeps Iran a minimal level of threshold capability.  This would keep the region safer, but would not entirely diminish the threat of a nuclear region in the future.  Israel has the bomb, so maintaining this threshold capability is seen as important to Iranian security.  The Geneva talks do however demonstrate movement on the issue, a willingness to negotiate, and a climb down by Iran.
 
So what are the dangers here?  We need to move the talks forward as a nuclear Iran will make the region and the globe more unstable.  If Iran fully develops nuclear weapons (we don’t know when in the future as this is contested by intelligence agencies) then it will start a nuclear arms race that will get out of control.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey at the very least will want to develop domestic nuclear weapons systems.  This will shatter the NPT, which is a very dangerous precedent and undermines all the efforts that have been in place to create a WMD free zone. It would also make a mockery of all the international non-proliferation policies in place.  At the same time, there is talk by some that Israel would be more inclined to move to a pre-emptive strike doctrine, which could be a source of future nuclear war in the region.  I disagree with this analysis.  I think we would move towards a more likely situation of low-level conflict under a nuclear umbrella (which reflected how things played out in India and Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil Crisis) and the acceleration of a regional cold war.

Egyptian Democracy and US Foreign Policy

Secretary Kerry’s recent trip to the region has refreshed the internal debate in Washington DC — this is a debate which is as confused as it is confusing.  It is a rehash of the classic debate between democracy versus stability and security.   What’s clear is that, in Washington circles, the operating premise since the Arab Spring has been that — we are not going to return to a period of stability any time soon, and the idea that Egypt will transition to a democracy is problematic.  Moreover, the notion that Egypt will move towards a democracy in a linear fashion is, to all effective purposes, dead (it should be said that very few in Washington circles held this belief in the first place; we shouldn’t confuse hopes and beliefs).

The feeling in Washington is that we are going through transitional iterations, from SCAF, to the Muslim Brotherhood and now the Sisi period.  In this sense we have been witnessing transition”s” in Egypt that have taken the shape of revolutions, counter-revolutions and Coups.  Within such a context, the day to day operations of the US towards Egypt, is to help this current transition move towards a more democratic outcome.  That is to say, US policy officially and unofficially is to try and influence Egypt’s transitional move in a more democratic direction as other interests are secured.  But the talk is of a period of “transition (to somewhere unknown)”, and not a “democratic transition” overall.

In spite of Obama’s speech to the UN General Assembly at the end of September, which clearly downgraded the importance of democracy promotion to a secondary interest, there is still talk of democracy promotion being one of many interests in the region.  Indeed, top US officials still argue that Secretary Kerry and his counter part Secretary Hegel continue to argue for democracy behind the scenes.  This is why the US is tying its hopes to the roadmap process, and felt the need to at least censure the Egyptian’s by cutting aid in early October.  But ultimately in the short-term, democracy promotion is seen as a means to greater security (a democratic peace), that is to be balanced with counter-terrorism cooperation more broadly, growing threats of terrorism in Sini (which is becoming more professionalised and better resourced as weapons move from Libya), interests in proliferation cooperation, and the maintenance of security cooperation with regards to the security of Israel.

So where are we now?  Ultimately, the US is facing an increasingly uphill set of challenges because of the chaining geopolitical and geo-strategic landscape of Egypt.

1) It is clear that issues of sequencing for Democracy have reared their head.

2) How to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist parties more generally has also become an issue complicated by Egyptian definitions of “counter-terrorism”.

3) Interventions from the Gulf states attempting to see the irradiation of the Muslim Brotherhood is also a new complication, along with the manner in which their economic support is delaying Egypt coming to terms with dealing with serious structural economic problems.  Indeed, Egypt now lives in a state of “just in time financing” that makes reserve adequacy measures meaningless … the economic crisis is coming, but predicting this is now something for soothsayers. Understanding how Egypt’s “muddle through economics” is going to play out is of immediate interest to all — is this going to be more like a Turkish or Pakistani transition.

4) It is clear that the Egyptian military does not have a holistic blueprint for the country, and the committee of 50 is not acting in the manner first envisaged. The military are seeing themselves as protectors of the Egyptian state, but they lack an overall strategic vision.  This in and of itself is an opening for the potential for democracy somewhere long down the road, but right now denies external partners a platform for negotiations.  The military is looking inwardly looking for security, stability and control, with a direction in mind.

5) Just as we are having trouble engaging from above, it is clear that we are having trouble engaging from below.  The Arab Spring has taught us valuable lessons about the nature of social mobilisation in the modern age, that as yet policy and its surrounding apparatus is having difficulty engaging with.  This tells us that we need a “deeper” level of engagement with these societies if we are to truly influence the debate about democracy and understand the hopes and desires of the Egyptian people.

6) There is clearly a need to get to grips with the causes of the 2011 revolution, including Egypt’s demographic troubles.  This speaks to a broader human security problem, where food and water security, economic security, political security etc. are dealt with and considered in this debate. The Egyptian military are going to look for “consensual politics” rather than “contesting politics”, which means that establishing these levels of human security is as much of interest to them as they should be to the US.  This is a point of cooperation, but the US needs to have its eye on democratic transitions if it is to support this route of action — in particular with regard to NGO laws that help provide a litmus test for the US and Egyptian commitments.

All in, there is no magic bullet to Egyptian Democracy, but what is clear is that the new debate in Washington is stuck around many of the same problems, and more, that it was before the Arab Spring.  What’s different is the growing instability in the region and the pace of change.  This tells us, that ultimately, maybe the tools and our thinking around this issue need to keep pace and be bolder.  We need a paradigm shift in how we engage the region that is fit for the 21st Century and not stuck around the policies of the past.

Media Q&A on US-MENA Relations and Kerry’s Tour

1. How would you define America’s current position in the Middle East?

At the heart of the US – Middle East relations is a security versus democracy problem.  This problem is caused by a “conflict of interests”. In the short to medium terms the US requires stability to secure the free flow of oil and gas into the world energy market, the movement and protection of military and commercial traffic through the Suez Canal, commercial business contracts, the security of regional allies such as Israel, and cooperation on military, intelligence, counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation issues.  At the same time, the virtues of promoting democracy in the region are at least at the rhetorical level well espoused.  Not only is promoting democracy seen as an extension of US values, but also as a contribution to a wider democratic peace that many believe will deliver greater international security, peace and prosperity.  Immediate security concerns draw the US towards requiring cooperation and stability, whilst promoting democracy creates direct confrontations, stymies cooperation and can create instability.  The conflict of interests problem stood as the fundamental problem faced by policymakers before the Arab Awakening, and this remains the case even as a much more fluid and complex policy-context has emerged.  It is little wonder, therefore, that the US  have ineffectively ebbed backwards and forwards in their democracy promotion strategies even as wide spread populist movements have generated new levels of instability that stretch from the Atlantic Ocean through the Arabian Sea. Given this context, the current US position is to act as a bystander in events and revert towards favouring its core strategic interests in the region.  President Obama made this clear in his speech to the UN General Assembly last month, and this was followed up by Susan Rice arguing that the administration wanted a less involved policy in the Middle East as it “pivots” to Asia.  Rice’s policy review, which was conducted almost exclusively by the White House, tells us that the current administration is putting a high value on restoring its relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel as it sees these countries as a fundamental part of its security strategy in the region.  The problem is that this may well be because the current administration is struggling to come to terms with the changing Middle East and the manner in which the geo-political and geo-strategic landscape is changing.  The current administration is trying to be pragmatic, but failing to really grasp how the region is changing.

2.And how effective do you think Kerry’s mideast trip will be?

Kerry’s trip around the Middle East will be effective at helping to provide some reassurance to allies, as the Secretary of State is effectively telling them that the United States wants to get back to business as usual, and will not push hard for political reforms in the region.  The trip is really about reassurance and damage control.  However, its long term effects will be minimal as events are outpacing policy.  This is often the case in foreign policy, but the way in which the Arab Spring is fundamentally chaining the region means that there are bound to be more crises rearing their heads.  This is at a time when this administration lacks a clear strategic vision and needs to think bigger, be bolder and get to grips with how the region is changing.

THIS WEEK

This is a busy week for the Middle East, with some important milestones.  We have already seen that Secretary Kerry is attempting to close the rift between Washington and Cairo, on the eve of the Morsi trial.  But hopefully there will be some movement on Syria on Tuesday, followed by movement on Iran on Wednesday.  Geneva is becoming a very busy place since the onset of the Arab Spring.  Thursday sees a continuation of Kerry’s tour, which by now it is clear should be called “the security and stability” tour.

Monday

Morsi faces judiciary
Islamists were planning huge protests at the scheduled start in Cairo of the trial of Egypt’s ousted president, Mohammed Morsi, on charges of inciting the murder of protesters. About 20,000 police officers and soldiers will stand guard.  — The trail has now been adjourned until January 2014.

Tuesday

Meeting on Syria 
US and Russian officials are to meet international special representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi in Geneva, as part of efforts to prepare the way for a full Syria peace conference later in November.

Wednesday

Iran nuclear talks
Tehran and the six major powers return to Geneva for detailed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme following last month’s discussions, which both sides called “positive”.

Thursday

Kerry visits Maghreb 
The US secretary of state, John Kerry, is to visit Algeria and Morocco as part of a tour of the region, continuing a strategic dialogue with a focus on security and counterterrorism, economics and civil society.

RT Crossfire Advanced Questions and Talking Points

We filmed an episode of Crosstalk today, so I thought I would share my talking points in advance of the show being aired on Monday.  Not everything here was said, but the questions they sent in advance will give you a broad sense of what was said on the show.

Is the term Arab Spring or Arab Awakening appropriate anymore? Do we
need to invent a new and different term to describe what is happening
in the Arab Middle East today?
 
It was never appropriate in the beginning.  When you spoke to protesters in the individual countries they would always refer to their countries “revolutions”.  I think our best method of looking at the phenomenon in the region, is to keep referring to them in this manner.  This helps us keep on track of the fact that whilst there was a “demonstration” effect that helped them spread across the region, all the revolutions were country specific.  It is safer to refer to the “revolutions” occurring through the region.  This is also particularly the case, as we don’t, and have never known, the directions these revolutions will take.  Spring and Awakening suggests a transition process to democracy, and it is far from guaranteed that this will be the case.
 
What to the countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria have in
common today (if any thing beyond being Arab Muslim countries)?
 
These countries still have a lot in common beyond being Arab Muslim countries. They have deeply troubled economies, high youth unemployment, a disproportionately high youth demographic, deep troubles with rule of law and security.  These are in fact the same conditions that led to the uprisings in the first place.  They differ in many of the problems they face, but broadly speaking the underlined causes of the revolutions are still there.  
 
Over two years ago many in the west (and their proxies on the ground
in the Arab Middle East) talked of democracy and western values in a
region in the hands of dictators for decades. Where does democracy
stand today in the region?
 
Any one who has studied democracy in the Arab world over decades will tell you that the region always takes one step forward, and two steps back.  But the Arab spring demonstrates that there is popular demand for rights, dignity and freedom.  The revolutions are a major leap forward for democracy in the region, and the genie has been let out of the bottle.  There is less willingness to accept the security guarantee of dictators, as the people in the region see that this hasn’t provided them with the basic things they need in their daily lives.  Of course, the situation on the ground differs across each of the countries, and some are moving forward more rapidly with what look like basic democratic institutions than others.  But overall, democratisation is a long process, and we certainly stand in a place where democracy looks more plausible today than it did in 2010.
To what degree have events in Syria been a “game changer” for the region?
 
Events in Syria are very important, and have important regional repercussions.  But overall, what happens in Syria is going to have little effect on the domestic revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.  We also have an important example of a more successful transition in Yemen, which shouldn’t be forgotten.  The problem with Syria has to do with the nature of the state structure.  The security forces are tied to the regime itself, which wasn’t the case in Tunisia and Egypt, and NATO intervention in Libya cancelled that particular dynamic out.  Are there going to be serious security problems in Syria for the forceable future, that will impact Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon?  They certainly will, but alternative trajectories are in place for the countries already undergoing revolutions.
 
Has western overt and/or covert involvement been a plus or minus in
the region over the past two years?
 
There was a period when US and EU involvement in the region was particularly high – throughout 2011-2012.  There was a greater emphasis on trying to promote democracy, and on helping successful democratic transitions to take place.  The September 11 embassy attacks, however, have lowered the willingness of the US to focus on this, and return to a more traditional “security and interests” focus.  So post-2012 the US has pulled back its presence in the region, and missed important opportunities.  Because of the problems with the way EU foreign policy is conducted and made, they have followed in the US foot steps.  

The show airs on Monday, so any feed back is welcome on here or twitter @ozhassan.

Postscript:  Link to Youtube show

Terrorism in North Africa

I was asked to provide comments for Sanlian LifeWeek Magazine in China today, and thought I would blog my responses in English …
Q:With regards to the two operations in Africa, does this demonstrate that the US is shifting its counter-terriorism battlefield from the Middle East to North Africa, while others argue that US is just sending a strong message to the world that the they will spare no effort to hold terrorists accountable, no matter where they hide or how long they evade justice?

A: It would be wrong to suggest that the US is shifting its counterterrorism policy from the Middle East to North Africa, as the US has always regarded the two areas as interlinked through its Near East Department and associated policies.  Indeed, lets not forget that some of the 9/11 attackers were from Egypt – in North Africa.  What is interesting about the two operations the US undertook was that it returned to a rendition policy that was highly unpopular under President George W. Bush.  At one level it sends a strong message that the US is willing to “hunt down” these terrorists no matter what time frame has passed, but it also signals a move away from using “Drones” to carryout extrajudicial killings.  This extrajudicial killing policy has been the most controversial dimension of the Obama foreign policy, as it goes against current human rights conventions and demonstrates a duplicity on the part of the US.

Q. As far as you’re concerned, in recent years, has terrorism in North Africa gotten  so much rampant that it disattracts US’ attention from other issues?

A. The US is capable of pursuing more than one issue at a time, so I don’t think its counter-terrorism policy in North Africa is a distraction.  However, the way the policy is framed does distract the US from paying attention to the domestic nature of the problems.  Terrorism in North Africa should be seen like a business as much as a political phenomenon.  For example, terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) make millions of dollars through drug trafficking and kidnaps.  Dealing with these local and regional problems requires a local and regional strategy.  However, with the Arab Spring and the removal of Gaddafi, the West has lost an ally, albeit brutally authoritarian, that was willing to take more regional responsibility for countering terrorism.  That is to say that fighting organisations like Al Qaeda in the Maghreb was in Gaddafi’s interest, which is why in 2009 Libyan security leaders met with their counter-parts from Algeria, Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania in the Algerian city Tamanrasset to formulate a regional terrorism strategy.  When Gaddafi was removed, the Tamanrasset agreement fell apart, removing the regional ability to deal with a growing counter-terrorism threat.  This however, is more of an issue for Europe than for the US. 

 For my other thoughts on Extremism in North Africa see mine and Elizabeth Iskander’s submission to the UK House of Lord Select Committee looking into the issue (here).