Egyptian Democracy and US Foreign Policy

Secretary Kerry’s recent trip to the region has refreshed the internal debate in Washington DC — this is a debate which is as confused as it is confusing.  It is a rehash of the classic debate between democracy versus stability and security.   What’s clear is that, in Washington circles, the operating premise since the Arab Spring has been that — we are not going to return to a period of stability any time soon, and the idea that Egypt will transition to a democracy is problematic.  Moreover, the notion that Egypt will move towards a democracy in a linear fashion is, to all effective purposes, dead (it should be said that very few in Washington circles held this belief in the first place; we shouldn’t confuse hopes and beliefs).

The feeling in Washington is that we are going through transitional iterations, from SCAF, to the Muslim Brotherhood and now the Sisi period.  In this sense we have been witnessing transition”s” in Egypt that have taken the shape of revolutions, counter-revolutions and Coups.  Within such a context, the day to day operations of the US towards Egypt, is to help this current transition move towards a more democratic outcome.  That is to say, US policy officially and unofficially is to try and influence Egypt’s transitional move in a more democratic direction as other interests are secured.  But the talk is of a period of “transition (to somewhere unknown)”, and not a “democratic transition” overall.

In spite of Obama’s speech to the UN General Assembly at the end of September, which clearly downgraded the importance of democracy promotion to a secondary interest, there is still talk of democracy promotion being one of many interests in the region.  Indeed, top US officials still argue that Secretary Kerry and his counter part Secretary Hegel continue to argue for democracy behind the scenes.  This is why the US is tying its hopes to the roadmap process, and felt the need to at least censure the Egyptian’s by cutting aid in early October.  But ultimately in the short-term, democracy promotion is seen as a means to greater security (a democratic peace), that is to be balanced with counter-terrorism cooperation more broadly, growing threats of terrorism in Sini (which is becoming more professionalised and better resourced as weapons move from Libya), interests in proliferation cooperation, and the maintenance of security cooperation with regards to the security of Israel.

So where are we now?  Ultimately, the US is facing an increasingly uphill set of challenges because of the chaining geopolitical and geo-strategic landscape of Egypt.

1) It is clear that issues of sequencing for Democracy have reared their head.

2) How to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamist parties more generally has also become an issue complicated by Egyptian definitions of “counter-terrorism”.

3) Interventions from the Gulf states attempting to see the irradiation of the Muslim Brotherhood is also a new complication, along with the manner in which their economic support is delaying Egypt coming to terms with dealing with serious structural economic problems.  Indeed, Egypt now lives in a state of “just in time financing” that makes reserve adequacy measures meaningless … the economic crisis is coming, but predicting this is now something for soothsayers. Understanding how Egypt’s “muddle through economics” is going to play out is of immediate interest to all — is this going to be more like a Turkish or Pakistani transition.

4) It is clear that the Egyptian military does not have a holistic blueprint for the country, and the committee of 50 is not acting in the manner first envisaged. The military are seeing themselves as protectors of the Egyptian state, but they lack an overall strategic vision.  This in and of itself is an opening for the potential for democracy somewhere long down the road, but right now denies external partners a platform for negotiations.  The military is looking inwardly looking for security, stability and control, with a direction in mind.

5) Just as we are having trouble engaging from above, it is clear that we are having trouble engaging from below.  The Arab Spring has taught us valuable lessons about the nature of social mobilisation in the modern age, that as yet policy and its surrounding apparatus is having difficulty engaging with.  This tells us that we need a “deeper” level of engagement with these societies if we are to truly influence the debate about democracy and understand the hopes and desires of the Egyptian people.

6) There is clearly a need to get to grips with the causes of the 2011 revolution, including Egypt’s demographic troubles.  This speaks to a broader human security problem, where food and water security, economic security, political security etc. are dealt with and considered in this debate. The Egyptian military are going to look for “consensual politics” rather than “contesting politics”, which means that establishing these levels of human security is as much of interest to them as they should be to the US.  This is a point of cooperation, but the US needs to have its eye on democratic transitions if it is to support this route of action — in particular with regard to NGO laws that help provide a litmus test for the US and Egyptian commitments.

All in, there is no magic bullet to Egyptian Democracy, but what is clear is that the new debate in Washington is stuck around many of the same problems, and more, that it was before the Arab Spring.  What’s different is the growing instability in the region and the pace of change.  This tells us, that ultimately, maybe the tools and our thinking around this issue need to keep pace and be bolder.  We need a paradigm shift in how we engage the region that is fit for the 21st Century and not stuck around the policies of the past.

RT Crossfire Advanced Questions and Talking Points

We filmed an episode of Crosstalk today, so I thought I would share my talking points in advance of the show being aired on Monday.  Not everything here was said, but the questions they sent in advance will give you a broad sense of what was said on the show.

Is the term Arab Spring or Arab Awakening appropriate anymore? Do we
need to invent a new and different term to describe what is happening
in the Arab Middle East today?
 
It was never appropriate in the beginning.  When you spoke to protesters in the individual countries they would always refer to their countries “revolutions”.  I think our best method of looking at the phenomenon in the region, is to keep referring to them in this manner.  This helps us keep on track of the fact that whilst there was a “demonstration” effect that helped them spread across the region, all the revolutions were country specific.  It is safer to refer to the “revolutions” occurring through the region.  This is also particularly the case, as we don’t, and have never known, the directions these revolutions will take.  Spring and Awakening suggests a transition process to democracy, and it is far from guaranteed that this will be the case.
 
What to the countries of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Syria have in
common today (if any thing beyond being Arab Muslim countries)?
 
These countries still have a lot in common beyond being Arab Muslim countries. They have deeply troubled economies, high youth unemployment, a disproportionately high youth demographic, deep troubles with rule of law and security.  These are in fact the same conditions that led to the uprisings in the first place.  They differ in many of the problems they face, but broadly speaking the underlined causes of the revolutions are still there.  
 
Over two years ago many in the west (and their proxies on the ground
in the Arab Middle East) talked of democracy and western values in a
region in the hands of dictators for decades. Where does democracy
stand today in the region?
 
Any one who has studied democracy in the Arab world over decades will tell you that the region always takes one step forward, and two steps back.  But the Arab spring demonstrates that there is popular demand for rights, dignity and freedom.  The revolutions are a major leap forward for democracy in the region, and the genie has been let out of the bottle.  There is less willingness to accept the security guarantee of dictators, as the people in the region see that this hasn’t provided them with the basic things they need in their daily lives.  Of course, the situation on the ground differs across each of the countries, and some are moving forward more rapidly with what look like basic democratic institutions than others.  But overall, democratisation is a long process, and we certainly stand in a place where democracy looks more plausible today than it did in 2010.
To what degree have events in Syria been a “game changer” for the region?
 
Events in Syria are very important, and have important regional repercussions.  But overall, what happens in Syria is going to have little effect on the domestic revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.  We also have an important example of a more successful transition in Yemen, which shouldn’t be forgotten.  The problem with Syria has to do with the nature of the state structure.  The security forces are tied to the regime itself, which wasn’t the case in Tunisia and Egypt, and NATO intervention in Libya cancelled that particular dynamic out.  Are there going to be serious security problems in Syria for the forceable future, that will impact Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon?  They certainly will, but alternative trajectories are in place for the countries already undergoing revolutions.
 
Has western overt and/or covert involvement been a plus or minus in
the region over the past two years?
 
There was a period when US and EU involvement in the region was particularly high – throughout 2011-2012.  There was a greater emphasis on trying to promote democracy, and on helping successful democratic transitions to take place.  The September 11 embassy attacks, however, have lowered the willingness of the US to focus on this, and return to a more traditional “security and interests” focus.  So post-2012 the US has pulled back its presence in the region, and missed important opportunities.  Because of the problems with the way EU foreign policy is conducted and made, they have followed in the US foot steps.  

The show airs on Monday, so any feed back is welcome on here or twitter @ozhassan.

Postscript:  Link to Youtube show

US Cuts Aid to Egypt – Holding Back the Toys

The reaction to the Obama administration cutting aid to Egypt has been mixed.  Israel has talked of its strategic necessity for peace and the Egyptian government has talked of how they regard it as the “wrong decision” and interference in domestic affairs, whilst Tamarod has welcomed the suspension of aid.  Reading twitter as the news began to break showed a level of strategic confusion over why the administration had chosen to act now.  Indeed, @slaugtherAM commented how odd it was given the current talks between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Nevertheless, the devil here is in the detail.  The symbolic and temporary suspension of 12 F16 fighters, Apache Helicopters, 4 tanks, harpoon missiles, a $260 cash transfer and $300 loan guarantee is not a complete and permanent suspension of aid.  The US is continuing to fund education health, counter-terror and military training programmes.  In that sense the timing reflects what President Obama eluded to in his speech to the UN general assembly, and ideas about how to react to the coup since July (the current Presidential style is contemplative and slow to say the least – as we witnessed over the troop surge decision in Afghanistan).  This is in effect a package that is symbolic and will make very little substantive difference to the US-Egyptian relationship.  Yes, the Egyptian’s want the technology – they are good “toys” – but this is not a serious attempt to influence the future political path of Egypt and does not cut deep into the heart of the relationship.  What is significant however, is that it reflects the first practical experiment of the Obama administration’s  report on US-MENA relations issued just before the Arab Spring began that conclued that peace between Egypt and Israel was no longer premised on the 1978 Camp David agreement, but by the fact that war was not in Egypt’s interest (read more in my book).  Is this a significant moment in US-Egypt’s relationship?  Maybe – it could turn into an interesting episode but ultimately the stability agenda continues; but it could also be the start of the Obama administration starting to slowly enact some of the strategic thinking about how to develop a grand strategy for the MENA region that it developed at the end of 2010 and throughout the Arab revolutions.  Yet, given the strategic importance of Egypt, the former is more likely.

Conversation on Twitter

Conversation on Twitter

Obama delays Egypt’s F16 Shipment

The growing violence in Egypt has led the US delaying the shipment of F16 fighter jets. With Egypt’s Defence Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi calling for mass protests in support of the Army, this should come as little surprise.  That the interim Egyptian government feels the need to call for such protests shows a clear concern that its legitimacy is being questioned.  Indeed, calling for mass protests is unlikely to restore calm across the country, as it makes clashes all the more likely.  This will simply add to the deteriorating security situation – which has already led  the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advising against all but essential travel  the country.

This initial step should concern the Egyptian army, as it may well open the flood gates to the US Congress limiting economic and military aid more widely.  With Egypt being the second largest recipient of US economic and military aid, second only to Israel, and  the Egyptian economy being in sever trouble – with an IMF deal stalled – this should spark concern.   Indeed for FY2014, POMED reports that this aid is being divided into four shipments and tied to state department conditions on the democratic process.  More widely, with renewed peace talks being led by John Kerry (and as reports suggest Martin Indyk) there is the potential that Congress may want to reconsider the terms of the aid in the first place.  Egypt is unstable, in transition and unable to provide internal security – does this sound like a partner for peace that should receive such large quantities of aid?  The US has traditionally been paying such aid as a “stability bargain” … this is not a stable situation.

Martin Indyk

F16

F16 (Photo credit: Jim Bahn)